Prior to the 1971 election, the Soeharto government ensured that legislative arrangements, such as the elections bill and political parties bill, were revised to guarantee government control. General elections were held in 1971 (for only the second time since 1955), with Golkar emerging as the largest party. The Muslim parties, which had 43 per cent of the combined votes in 1955, only obtained 29 per cent. The Nationalist Party, which had been the largest party in 1955 (but not a dominant party), was relegated to the status of a minor party, as all government servants and non-Islamic groups were "persuaded" to vote for Golkar.
Golkar's strategy for winning elections is interesting. Golkar was transformed into a de facto "state party" as it consisted of three components, namely the bureaucracy, military and non-civil servants.3
The structure was akin to a command system, ranging from the national level up to the provincial levels. All civil servants had to pledge their loyalty to Golkar. It is thus understandable why Golkar was able to exercise political hegemony for almost three decades.
During the initial stages of the New Order, the military establishment and Soeharto were one, and Soeharto became the mentor [pembina) which directly controlled Golkar. All appointments had to meet with his approval. It was only later that Soeharto and the military began to diverge, and the former decided to utilize Golkar as his own personal vehicle. Soeharto was able to achieve this through various means. While he was able to control the military, he was unable to gain its full support. In response, he divided the military into groups, so that no group would be strong enough to challenge him. Another vital controlling device was the establishment of his own foundations [yayasari) , controlled by he and his family, to ensure the flow of funds for political purposes (Suryadinata 1997a) .
Soeharto was aware that military support for him would steadily erode. With the rise of political Islam, he began to cultivate several Islamic groups and co-opt Muslim leaders. He even introduced reforms in Golkar, one of which enabled a non-military man to be the general chairman, breaking a two-decade long tradition. By 1992, Harmoko, Soeharto's confidant who later betrayed him, was made the chairman of Golkar against the opposition of the military. Soeharto also made his daughter, Siti Hardijanti Hastuti, better known as "Tutut", as one of the chairpersons of Golkar, and his son, Bambang Trihatmodjo, as the treasurer of the party. Despite the erosion of military support for Golkar, there was no doubt that Golkar still relied on their support to ensure electoral success. It was not surprising that on 13 March 1996, prior to the 1997 election, General Hartono, an army general who was a staunch supporter of Soeharto, claimed that "ABRI [Indonesian armed Table 1 Indonesian Election Results, 1971-97 (Percentage of votes cast) Party 1971 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 PDI_10.09_8JB0_7.88 1 Source: Suryadinata 1998, p. 199. forces] is the cadre of Golkar" (Stanley 19 a yellow jacket, which is the colour of Go 48).
In the six elections conducted during the New Order era, Golkar not only won every one, but also garnered more than 62 per cent of the votes (see Table 1 ). Nevertheless, it should be noted that Golkar gained the highest number of votes at the 1997 election, the most violent election during the Soeharto era. Golkar committed various violations and more repressive measures were applied during the 1997 election, making Golkar less legitimate. As a result, the ruling party lost its grip.
The Decline of Golkar and the Rise of a Multiparty System
There had been significant socio-political changes within Indonesian society during the 32 years of the New Order, and increasing antagonism between the ruling party and opposition groups. Soeharto wanted to retain power through military means, but this was increasingly unacceptable to the Indonesian middle class, and especially to Indonesian students. Political Islam also surfaced and the military, which used to be under Soeharto's control, was no longer solidly behind him. All these factors weakened Soeharto's power base. The 1997-98 economic crisis made Soeharto more vulnerable. The May 1998 riots and the subsequent students demonstrations eventually forced the aging military leader to step down, giving his position to the vice president, Dr B.J. Habibie.4
Golkar was divided into two groups after the fall of Soeharto: one led by Habibie and the other by Edi Sudradjat, a retired army general who had been the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.5 The first group consisted mainly of civilians who were closely linked to Soeharto, while the other was comprised of retired military generals and people who were critical of Soeharto and Habibie. These two groups also represented Islamic nationalists and secular nationalists respectively. To prepare for the forthcoming parliamentary elections, Golkar decided to hold an extraordinary National Congress during 9-11 July 1998. Prior to the congress, the two groups had put forward their own candidates. Akbar Tandjung, who represented the Habibie group, and Edi Sudradjat, who was anti-Habibie, contested the general chairmanship of Golkar. The incumbent general chairman, Harmoko, was asked to step down as he was blamed for lying to Soeharto that the people still wanted him to serve another term.6 Interestingly, he was also hated by Soeharto loyalists for stabbing his boss in the back during the May 1998 crisis ? Harmoko openly asked Soeharto to step down as he was no longer needed by the people. This shows that
Harmoko was a great opportunist. Initially he thought that Soeharto would able to hold on to power, therefore he told the president one thing but during the crisis he realized that Soeharto would be unable to maintain his grip on power and he quickly changed positions.
According to the regulations, the Golkar chairman was to be elected by the 27 regional (provincial) representatives (Dewan Pimpinan Daerah I, DPDI), not by Golkar members. The majority of these representatives were ex-military officers. Initially, it was reported that Edi Sudradjat had gained more support than Akbar (Sudradjat 2000, p. 45) . It was also reported that Soeharto and his family supported Edi because they wanted to punish both Harmoko and Habibie for betraying the former president. However, the Edi group, which was critical of Soeharto and his family, denied the first report.7 Just prior to the voting, however, some regional representatives changed their mind. It was reported that only 10 representatives supported Edi while 13 representatives sided with Akbar.8 Four representatives were undecided.9 It is worth noting that three representatives were ex-military men. While Akbar needed one more vote to win, Edi required all four votes.
During the congress, a rumour circulated that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) would not accept Golkar if the elected general chairman was unable to support the present Indonesian national leadership. The IMF then played an important role during the Indonesian crisis. If the new Golkar chairman belonged to the old guard, it would not be acceptable to the IMF, and the IMF would not render any support to Indonesia. The rumour definitely benefited Akbar more than Edi.10 According to one report, Habibie, as the president and leader of Golkar, had instructed the governors of all provinces to support Akbar. The night before the vote took place, there were also contacts between the Akbar group and regional representatives. "Money politics" was said to have played a role.11 When the votes were counted, Akbar gained 17 while Edi received only 10.12 The attitude of the military on this matter was also important. Although Lt-Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the military officer in charge of social-political matters, stated that it was up to Golkar to decide whom it wanted to be the new general chairman,13 many believed that Yudhoyono preferred Akbar to Edi, because Edi was Yudhoyono's former boss and it would be easier for Yudhoyono to deal with Akbar. There was also a report that General Wiranto, who was then Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, had stated that he would like to see a general chairman who could work with the Habibie government. It was also reported that he had instructed regional cornmanders to tell their Golkar regional representatives to vote for Akbar (Sudradjat 2000, p. 45) With the support of Habibie, Akbar became the new chairman of Golkar.14 Similar to Soeharto, Habibie also wanted to make Golkar his personal electoral vehicle as he felt that he could no longer rely on Soeharto. From Habibie's perspective, Soeharto and his family members were more of a liability than an asset. The Habibie group was not anti-Soeharto. In fact, the Habibie government was seen to be an extension of the Soeharto regime, and the president was never able to completely sever ties with Soeharto. Nevertheless, in the new Golkar, there was also a group, led by Akbar Tandjung, which wanted to distance itself not only from Soeharto but also from Habibie. However, these two groups had something in common in that they were dominated by non-Javanese and were close to Islam. Although members of the "Akbar group" had closely collaborated with Soeharto in the past, they felt that now was the time to dissociate themselves. Yet they were unable to create a new party as their basis was still the New Order elite. This group consisted of people who were leaders of the HMI (Islamic Students Association), including Akbar Tandjung (former national chairman of HMI) and Fahmi Idris (former Jakarta chairman of HMI). These two groups, which were not antagonistic, collaborated when they wanted to "revitalize" Golkar soon after the fall of Soeharto. In fact, Akbar was initially supported by Habibie as both knew that they needed to be united in order to defeat the retired generals who wanted to recapture Golkar. It was with the support of Habibie and Wiranto that Akbar became the general chairman of Golkar.
Habibie, as the new president of Indonesia, directly controlled Golkar. There was a practice of primordialism17 known as SDM ? an abbreviation of Sumber Daya Makasar (Makassar's resources) and SOS ? an abbreviation of Semua Orang Sulawesi (All Sulawesi's men) (Stanley 1999, p. 169) . Irsyad Sudiro, a Javanese and the speaker of Golkar faction in the DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat), was replaced by Habibie's crony Andi Mattalata, a Makassarese (Stanley 1999, p. 170) . Sudiro questioned the decision but was ignored by Akbar. Later three other Members of Parliament who were close to Edi Sudradjat were also "recalled" from parliament (Stanley 1999, p. 171) . As a matter of fact, initially Akbar, if not Habibie, attempted to persuade Edi to stay but the overture was flatly rejected. Once it became clear that there was no possibility of reconciliation, Akbar and Habibie began to purge their opponents. It was reported that by 13 August 1998, 142 DPR/MPR members had been recalled and on 15 October 1998, 86 new members were installed (Zenzie 1999, pp. 253-54) .
During the Soeharto era, Golkar consisted of three components: the military, the bureaucracy and non-civil servants. However, during the reformasi period, when Akbar took over power, the military left Golkar, at least in terms of formal structure. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, then Head of the Social-Political Section of Armed Forces, stated in 1998 that ABRI (later, after April 2000, Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI) had started to withdraw its support for Golkar.18 Akbar wanted the bureaucracy to remain in Golkar but the new civil service law issued before the 1999 election prohibited civil servants from holding positions in political parties (including Golkar). This separation undoubtedly weakened Golkar.
Golkar was further weakened by the departure of the Edi Sudradjat/Try Sutrisno group. In July 1998, soon after their defeat in the Golkar general chairman contest, Edi and Try supported the formation of the Barisan Nasional (national front), an anti-Soeharto and anti-Habibie organization. The group, led by retired General Kemal Idris, consisted of many retired generals who were "secular nationalists". They considered Habibie, Akbar and Feisal Tanjung to be pro-political Islam and labelled them the "Green Group", while they themselves were known as the "red and white" group (Red and White are the colours of the Indonesian flag, signifying that the group adopted secular nationalism in their orientation) (Stanley, 1999, p.185) .
Not long after this, a group of intellectuals who also favoured the Pancasila ideology rather than Islam formed the Gerakan Keadilan dan Pesatuan Bangsa (Movement for National Justice and Unity). These two groups later established the Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan, a new party led by Edi Sudradjat.
The new Golkar, known as the Partai Golkar (Golkar Party) after
July 1998, was ready to contest the general election scheduled for June 1999. Unlike previous elections during the New Order era, this election was conducted under democratic conditions. There were 48 parties which contested the elections under the new electoral arrangements. Both national and international observers were allowed to monitor the elections. The military, which had been weakened after the fall of Soeharto, appeared to remain neutral during the election, although a number of irregularities involving threatening behaviour did occur.
Faced with this new situation, some observers predicted that
Golkar would be totally defeated, as Soeharto had been discredited. However, Golkar leaders hoped to win a significant number of votes, as the party was still intact and had financial resources. One source gave 30-40 per cent votes as the Golkar target (Stanley 1999, p. 245 ).
Nevertheless, it faced several new parties which were more popular, in particular the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (PDI-P, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) led by Megawati Sukarnoputri, the Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN, National Mandate Party) led by Dr Amien Rais, former chairman of Muhammadiah, the second largest Muslim association in Indonesia, and the Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB, National Awakening Party), unofficially led by Abdurrahman Wahid, leader of Nadlatul Ulama (NU), the largest Muslim association in Indonesia. However, the results defied predic tions made by the Indonesian media.
Golkar and the 1999 General Election
The Indonesian press, which was generally pro-reformasi, predicted that newly formed parties would be popular and hence would collect more votes. Partai Golkar and the PPP ? the "New Order parties"
? would, it predicted, perform very poorly in the election. The election results showed that the PDI-P gained the largest bloc of votes but this was only slightly more than one third of the total votes cast. showing that the influence of the New Order had not disappeared entirely (see Table 2 ).19 Golkar's success is easy to understand, as the Habibie government was basically an extension of the New Order. The bureaucracy and the old political mechanisms remained intact and the Habibie regime was able to use these to promote the interests of Golkar and the PPP. On the political scene, there was a noticeable change after the election. Golkar was no longer the dominant party. The new party ? the PDI-P ? emerged as the largest political organization. The role of the military had declined, the clamour for more press freedom continued and there was also a growth of both the middle class in urban areas and of Islamic political activities.
The relatively good performance of Golkar, apart from its organizational strength and money politics, was due partly to the greater electoral weight given to the outer islands. For instance, to gain a seat in Aceh only required 82,385 votes; in South Sulawesi only 155,516 votes; while in Central Java, the required number was 291,597 votes. This also explains why the PPP, which was stronger in the outer islands, obtained 58 seats with only 10.72 per cent of votes, while the PKB, which got 12.66 per cent of the votes, only obtained 51 seats. There was a strong anti-Javanese sentiment in the outer islands. In addition, "money politics" also played a role ? it was widely reported that Golkar bought votes during the election.20 (Stanley 1999, p. 257) . Apparently "money politics" played a role: Habibie himself promised Golkar Rp 300 billion once he was elected the sole presidential candi date. During the National Leadership Meeting, it was reported that the same strategy was used again. Many who opposed Habibie's nomination changed their mind, as they were offered between Rp 1 billion and 3 billion per person (Stanley 1999, p. 257.) Habibie was declared the sole presidential candidate of Golkar at the end of the National Leadership Meeting, and the other four candidates were made vice presidential candidates. Outsiders discerned the existence of two camps ? the Habibie camp and the Akbar Tandjung camp ? and called the former the "Black" Golkar (Golkar "Hitam") and the latter "White" Golkar (Golkar "Putih") .21 Due to the close connection of Habibie and the New Order, the Habibie group was blamed for Golkar's poor performance during the 1999 general election. Golkar targeted 40 per cent of the votes during the election but gained only 22 per cent (Stanley 1999, p. 245) . Nevertheless, the Habibie group, strongly supported by A.A. Baramuli, argued that it was the fault of the Akbar Tanjung group. He claimed that he was able to deliver in the outer islands, especially in Eastern Indonesia, but the Akbar Tandjung group was unable to do the same in Java.22 A few weeks before the general election, the The sign that Habibie was in serious trouble came on 14 October 1999 during his accountability speech to the MPR. He claimed that while his administration may not have achieved political stability, it had stabilized the economy. He expected that the MPR would endorse his speech, but reaction among its members varied. Golkar was lukewarm while the opposition parties, especially PDI-P and PKB, were critical. Other factions were not particularly enthusiastic either. Since there was no consensus on the speech, it was put to a vote on 19 October. Prior to the vote Habibie was confident that his speech would be accepted. But to the surprise of Habibie and his Golkar as an Abangan and Non-Javanese-Dominated Party?
There is no doubt that Golkar has undergone significant changes since 1998. Not only is it no longer a hegemonic party, but it has also shed its abangan character. Ideologically, it continues to be based on Pancasila, but Islamic elements have penetrated the party and it no longer champions the abangan culture. But Golkar is basically "secular" as it subscribes to Pancasila and nationalism; the Islamic symbols have not replaced the previous abangan symbols. Besides, it does not advocate an Islamic state nor the return to the Jakarta Charter, in which Muslims are required to practice shariah (Islamic law). For one thing, the secular nationalist elements are still quite strong within the regional representatives and its supporters. During the Soeharto era, the Javanese clique dominated Golkar. However, towards the end of his rule, he brought in non-Javanese, some of whom were Islamic-inclined, planting the seeds for the non Javanese takeover of the party. Examining post-Soeharto Golkar office holders, it is clear that the number of non-Javanese has increased significantly. However, the non-Javanese Golkar leaders were divided into two groups: the South Sulawesi Group and the Sumatran Group. When Habibie was president, the South Sulawesi group was powerful. Indeed, the majority of Golkar members in the DPR/MPR belonged to the Habibie group. However, after the fall of Habibie, the Sumatra group gained the upper hand within the organization, but Golkar members in the DPR/MPR (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) 
The 2004 Parliamentary Election
The internal struggle was temporarily suspended in the run-up to parliamentary elections in April 2004. The PDI-P also suffered from internal divisions and its popularity was declining, providing a chance for Golkar to grow again at the PDI-P's expense. Akbar was seen to be in the front line and Golkar emerged as the largest party in the 2004 election, defeating the PDI-P. Nevertheless, the percentage of votes was still lower than what it had gained in 1999. Akbar was credited with revitalizing Golkar.
As had happened in the 1999 elections, Golkar won in most provinces of the outer islands, although its numbers in Java also increased (see Table 3 ). The PDI-P, however, only won in three provinces, namely Central Java, Bali and East Indonesia, indicating that it was still a Bali and Java-based party. The PKB, the third largest party, was also Java-based. It only won in East Java which was the stronghold of the NU. It should be noted that there were two new parties which emerged in the 2004 parliamentary elections, namely the Partai Demokrat (PD), which was controlled by Susilo Bambang Yuhdhoyono, the former security chief in the Megawati cabinet, and the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), an Islamic party which was based on the Partai Keadilan (PK). The former was strong in Java while the latter was influential in Jakarta and the outer islands. Both Tutut and Hartono were unhappy with their ouster from Golkar and wanted to create a rival to it during the 2004 election. Initially, Hartono went to see Soeharto for advice. Soeharto noted that there was no need to take over Golkar and instead suggested he establish another party. Hartono reportedly seized the opportunity to do so, leading to the creation of the PKPB.34 However, the party was a failure as it only secured less than 2 per cent of the total votes.
The 2004 Golkar Convention and the Fall of Akbar Tandjung
Once the parliamentary election had ended, parties that had polled more than 5 per cent of total votes or 3 per cent of the national parliamentary seats were qualified to put forward a presidential candidate.35 Prior to the parliamentary election, Akbar had collabor ated with other parties in order to consolidate his position in the party. His cooperation with Megawati eventually freed him from the accusation of corruption in the Bulloggate scandal. Initially, it was rumored that Akbar would join hands with Megawati to be her deputy in the presidential election, but the victory of Golkar over the PDI-P changed the picture. Since Golkar was the largest party, Akbar could no longer accept a secondary position. Akbar wanted to contest the presidential election on the Golkar ticket, but was challenged by many presidential hopefuls: Wiranto, Suryo Paloh (an Acehnese media tycoon), Prabowo Subianto (the former son-in-law of Soeharto) and Aburizal Bakrie (a Bugis business tycoon).
The emergence of Wiranto was unexpected, as he was not active within the party. As a retired general he was rumoured to have secured the backing of the Soeharto group and therefore presented a threat to Akbar. Indeed, in the first round the voting was close but
Akbar was ahead of Wiranto by 10 votes (see Table 4 ). The other candidates were left behind. Since no candidate gained more than On 31 August, the Fahmi Idris group established the Golkar Party Reform Forum, to bolster support for Yudhoyono-Kalla. Kalla, also from Golkar, attended the declaration. Akbar decided to expel those leaders who openly supported Yudhoyono-Kalla, including Fahmi Idris and Marzuki Darussman. Earlier, Akbar also illegally expelled Kalla for being disloyal to Golkar. However, the second round of the presidential election was a big blow to Akbar: Yudhoyono-Kalla gained 61.2 per cent of the votes while the Megawati-Solahuddin team, which was supported by Akbar, only gained 38.8 per cent. With the defeat of Megawati, Akbar's political future looked dim.
Golkar's 2004 National Congress
After the second round of the presidential election, Golkar scheduled a national congress between 15-20 December, the main purposes of which was to elect a new chairman. The incumbent, Akbar Tandjung, wanted to retain his position. Prior to the election, senior members of Golkar, including leaders of its the eight affiliated organizations, held a special meeting in Jakarta to make preparations to unseat Akbar. These senior leaders included former presidential candidate Wiranto, former Golkar chairman Harmoko, former State Secretary Moerdiono, former Advisory Council member Siswono Yudhohusodo and former Manpower Minister Cosmas Batubara. The slogan was ABA: asal bukan Akbar (Anybody But Akbar). Akbar, however, fought back. He travelled extensively around the country to garner the support of provincial and district Golkar leaders, reportedly distributing around US$10 million. This money was reportedly given by former president Megawati "to secure Golkar's support for her re-election".37
In the run-up to the congress, there emerged a number of contenders: Surya Paloh, a media tycoon who was close to Yudhoyono, Marwah Daud, a staunch opponent of Akbar, Agung Laksono, who was the new speaker of the House, Abu Rizal Bakrie, the current coordinating minister of economy and General Wiranto. Kalla's candidacy was a surprise as many maintained that there was a conflict of interest between the positions of vice-presidency and the general chairmanship of Golkar, as the vice-president is supposed to represent the state and not party interests. However, Kalla did not agree. Kalla, a Bugis tycoon, was much richer than Akbar; and was not short of funding for the Golkar election.
Akbar was quite confident that he would get more support within the party than his rivals as he was the person who had "saved"
Golkar from ignominy. As an experienced politician, Akbar succeeded in changing the party constitution to strengthen his position. The congress had accepted that the voting rights would be extended to the delegates of DPD II, while in the past, they were confined to the delegates of DPD I. With this amendment, the delegates who could vote increased from 36 to 484. Akbar was better known at the district level than Kalla. In addition, the constitution also stipulated that a qualified candidate should have served in Golkar as an executive member for at least five years. This was meant to exclude Kalla and Wiranto. All candidates were vetted in a complex process. Neverthe less, Kalla passed the screening after a long delay. During the convention, the names of five personalities emerged as possible candidates: Akbar Tandjung, Wiranto, Jusuf Kalla, Marwah Daud and Slamet Effendi Jusuf. The last one was not well known. He was an NU member who had joined Golkar to be the head of the Youth Department of the party and was later promoted to deputy chairman.38
Akbar had attempted to make deals with other contestants. It was However, if we look at the history of Golkar, it would not have been difficult to guess that Akbar would be eventually pushed aside as he was in a position of weakness. Akbar had many enemies within Golkar and these enemies, apart from Wiranto, threw their support behind Kalla. The majority of the delegates felt that Akbar would not be able to offer any tangible benefits such as government positions, while Kalla would. Even Akbar's close ally, Agung Laksono, abandoned him to join Kalla, as he was promised the newly created President Yudhoyono had a vested interest in making Kalla the general chairman of Golkar, so that Golkar would co-operate with the government in parliament. If Akbar won the general chairmanship, the Yudhoyono government would encounter difficulties in passing legislation, as the National Coalition had a larger number of MPs compared to the government. With Golkar in the hands of Kalla, the government would have fewer problems in implementing its policies.
Therefore, it would not be in Yudhoyono's interest to allow Akbar to retain the general chairmanship of Golkar.
In fact, the 2004 Golkar National Congress was significant as the party constitution was further amended to make it more democratic.
The voting rights were extended to DPD II. Nevertheless, like the past general chairman elections, money politics was also played a part, and it was widely reported that the delegates were given money to secure their support. The victory of Kalla also raised the profile of big business within Golkar, as most of Kalla's allies are business figures.
The victory of Jusuf Kalla as the general chairman of Golkar and Agung Laksono as the deputy general chairman was significant, not only for President Yudhoyono but also for Kalla himself. Kalla may have an ambition to be the next president and Golkar would provide a suitable vehicle. Some have even argued that Kalla will be Yudhoyono's rival in the long run as the former controls the largest party in the parliament. However, in the short run, it is not likely that Kalla will do anything to challenge Yudhoyono as he has not yet consolidated power, and his success in the election could not be separated from his association with Yudhoyono. Moreover, Kalla was not known as a strong party leader in Golkar and his real power base is still in South Sulawesi rather than at the national level.
Golkar's 2006 National Leadership Meeting
Kalla assumed the top position in Golkar and appeared to be more powerful than Yudhoyono. In May 2005, for instance, Kalla was interviewed by Kompas where he was quoted as saying that his task was not confined to economic affairs and that "president and vice president won the election together and therefore have the same responsibility"CKompas, 7 May 2005). This gave the impression that Kalla's rights and Yudhoyono's rights were on par. Two examples can be used to show Kalla's high profile activities: he was in charge of the tsunami relief operation, and initiated talks with the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) separatist group, both of which were supposed to have been done by Yudhoyono. Nevertheless, it was later explained that Kalla as vice-president was assisting the president, not taking over his tasks. Regardless of Kalla's high profile actions in the government, regional leaders of Golkar complain that he has not done anything to benefit Golkar at the grassroots level. Golkar has succeeded in staying in politics. Apart from the support of the old forces and its strong machinery all over Indonesia, its success has also been partly due to the purging of Soeharto and his family from the party. The "new" leaders, although associated previously with the New Order, have managed to project the image of a new, civilian Golkar. They have quietly embraced Islamic elements so that the party no longer has an anti-Islamic image. In fact, some voters have come to see post-Soeharto Golkar as an Islamic party.46 Yet, Golkar remains as secular party in the sense that it has continued to subscribe to the Pancasila ideology rather than Islam, arid it has not altered the non-Islamic symbols of the party. The ethnic composition of the leadership has changed in the post-Soeharto period, and non Javanese are holding key positions.
Golkar is divided into many factions based on ethnicity and region. These factions have continued to jostle for power. They are:
the Sulawesi group (earlier known as the Irama Suka Nusantara) now represented by Jusuf Kalla, the Sumatra group represented by Akbar Tandjung, the Javanese group represented by Agung Laksono and others. The Sumatran (Batak) group lost its power after the Bali Congress, the Sulawesi group is on the rise, and the Javanese group is waiting in the wings.
Golkar continues to project an image of a non-Javanese rather than a Javanese party. In the 1999 elections, it won the majority of the votes from the outer islands rather than the Javanese provinces, while the PDI-P and the PKB emerged as Javanese-based parties. In the 2004 elections, the performance of Golkar was still strong outside Java but improved in Java. The non-Javanese image of Golkar, however, has not yet disappeared. It is possible that in the future, the Javanese might regain control of Golkar as the non Javanese factions have been fighting against one another, enabling the Javanese to consolidate their position. However, unlike during the Soeharto era when the Javanese were predominant, Javanese now are prepared to share power with the non-Javanese.
It should also be pointed out that Golkar has undergone significant changes. Initially Golkar was dominated by the military which was represented by Soeharto himself. Gradually it became dominated by the civilian bureaucracy represented by Akbar Tandjung (and Habibie). With the defeat of Akbar, Golkar has now become a party dominated by big business as represented by Jusuf Kalla. Neverthe less, the bureaucratic elements have remained strong.
The post-Soeharto era has given rise to a plural political party system where there is no dominant party. Political power is divided among a few major political parties. Apart from the "older parties" such as Golkar, PDI-P and PPP, there is also PAN, PKB, PD and the PKS. The rise of PD is interesting as this is a secular party dominated by Yudhoyono. The political landscape of Indonesian politics has become more complicated than in the past, and the political ideology has remained divided. On the one hand, ther are political parties which are secular such as Golkar, PDI-P an PD, while on the other hand, there are Islamic parties such as PPP, PKS and PBB. The PAN and PKB, however, claim to be Pancasil parties but actually are based on two Islamic organizations. the future, there may be fusion between ideologically similar parties but in the short run, fragmentation of political parties wil continue.
Golkar, a political organization which was closely linked to Soeharto, has managed to survive. It has regained its primary place in Indonesian politics, but it is far from controlling the Indonesian political scene. Anti-Golkar forces are strong and will try to prevent it from regaining its former dominance.
NOTES
I have been studying Golkar since the early 1980s and have published the following: one book on Golkar proper (Suryadinata 1989) , one article on Golkar (Suryadinata 1997b) , later republished in a collection of my articles (Suryadinata 1998) , and a few books (some are jointly authored books) in which Golkar is discussed in some detail (Suryadinata 2002; Ananta, Arifin and Suryadinata 2004; Ananta, Arifin, Suryadinata, 2005) . This article has not only drawn from the above mentioned publications but also contains new information not included in them. Moreover, it represents my reflections on post-Soeharto Golkar.
The terms abangan, priyayi and santri as analytical concepts were first introduced by Clifford Geertz (Geertz 1960) . Abangan is used to refer to Javanese Muslims who are "syncretic" in their beliefs, the priyayi are influenced by Hinduism, while santri are "purer" in their Islamic beliefs. Geertz's concepts have been criticized. For a brief discussion on this, see Ananta, Arifin and Suryadianata (2004, pp. 8-9 ).
This component is also called Golkar proper.
When selecting Habibie as vice-president, Soeharto did not think that he would be forced to step down. His selection of Habibie was based on the following factors: he had no independent base, was loyal to him and hence did not pose a threat. Soeharto did not expect that during the May crisis he would be manoeuvered by Habibie and Soeharto's loyalists to pass the presidency to
Habibie. In retrospect, and from Soeharto's perspective, the selection of Habibie was correct because Habibie was too close to Soeharto to put him on trial.
Try Sutrisno was a retired general who was former Vice-President of Indonesia 29 The information was provided to me by a leading political observer in Jakarta.
